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Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the 
Death of Liberal Reformism  
in the Philippines 
Mark R. Thompson 
Abstract: Since assuming the presidency, Rodrigo R. Duterte has “stuck to 
his guns” in carrying out his campaign pledge to launch a violent anti-drug 
campaign. Duterte’s presidency was preceded by six years of political stabil-
ity and high growth under the relatively liberal and supposedly reformist 
administration of President Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino, III. What did 
voters find so appealing about Duterte given that drugs and criminality were 
not a major national concern until he launched his candidacy? Unlike previ-
ous populist politicians in the post-Marcos Philippines, Duterte’s strongest 
support did not come from the poorest voters but rather from the elite and 
the middle class who most feared for their personal security. Although 
Aquino was widely perceived to be personally honest, his administration had 
become “systemically disjunctive” and vulnerable to replacement by violent 
illiberalism because its narrative of “good governance” had been under-
mined, its strategic allies were weakened, and liberal institutions discredited. 
Duterte is an illiberal populist who changed the prevailing political order 
into an illiberal one through a new law-and-order governing script, new key 
strategic groups (the communist left and the police), and the quick removal 
of remaining liberal constraints (particularly in Congress and the Supreme 
Court). Duterte constructed a strongman political model at the local level 
before “nationalising” it after his election as president. 
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Introduction 
I’m telling the Filipino people, huwag ako (not me) […] If I be-
come president, it would be bloody because we’ll order the killing 
of all criminals […] [particularly the] drug lords – Rodrigo Duterte 
[…] who will protect us from our protectors? – Ayn Rand 
Since assuming the presidency in late June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte has 
“stuck to his guns,” carrying out his campaign pledge to crack down 
quickly and violently on drug dealers and addicts. The bloody anti-drug 
campaign had already claimed over 6,100 lives between Duterte’s inaugu-
ration as president in late June and the end of December 2016 when this 
article1 was drafted, through “legitimate police encounters” and “victims 
of extrajudicial or vigilante-style killings” (Bueza 2016). This represents 
an average of nearly 50 people killed daily since Duterte assumed office. 
This number is already higher than the 3,250 non-combatants Amnesty 
International estimated were killed extra-judicially after dictator Ferdi-
nand E. Marcos declared martial law in September 1972 until it was lifted 
in January 1981 (Mangahas 2016).  
The violently illiberal turn of Philippine politics since Duterte’s elec-
tion in the May 9 Philippine presidential elections is puzzling when one 
considers it was preceded by six years of political stability and high 
growth (averaging nearly 6 per cent) under a (relatively) liberal and (sup-
posedly) reformist administration of President Benigno “Noynoy” S. 
Aquino, III. This continued the economic acceleration under Aquino’s 
predecessor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo but without the political threats 
(her administration faced mass demonstrations and several coup at-
tempts). The Aquino administrations economic and political perfor-
mance was a major improvement over nearly a “lost decade” of negative 
or slow growth and periodic political tumult from 1983–1992 shortly 
                                                 
1  The author would like to thank the participants at a panel on the early Duterte 
presidency held at the International Studies Association Asia-Pacific Confer-
ence Hong Kong on 25–26 June at the City University of Hong Kong where an 
earlier draft of this and several other papers in this special issue were presented. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to the organisers and participants 
of the Philippine Update Conference at the Australian National University 
(with special thanks to convenors Dr Imelda Deinla and Dr Nicole Curato) and 
a talk hosted by the Saw Swee Hok Southeast Centre of the London School of 
Economics on 25 October (with thanks to the chair Dr Jürgen Haacke) where 
later drafts were presented. I would also like to thank the Hong Kong Research 
Grants Council (RGC) for the research grant 145013 that has funded several 
research visits to the Philippines. 
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before and after the fall of Marcos. Although levels of inequality re-
mained high under the (second) Aquino administration (Noynoy’s moth-
er Corazon C. Aquino was president from 1986–1992), Noynoy Aquino 
had the highest popularity levels over his term than any post-Marcos 
president before him (SWS 2016).  
What was it about Duterte’s message that voters found so appealing, 
given that drugs and criminality were not a major worry of voters ac-
cording to polls until Duterte launched his candidacy and began carrying 
out his promise as president (Pulse Asia 2014–2016)?2 Data show that 
crime has been declining for several years and serious crime was also 
decreasing at the end of the Aquino administration (Baldwin and Mar-
shall 2016). However, a plurality of voters choose Duterte, who had 
threatened to declare martial law if the drug problem could not be 
brought under control, despite a survey at the end of 2015 finding that 
more than three-fourths of Filipinos were satisfied with the way democ-
racy works in the country, up from a low of 28 per cent during Aquino’s 
predecessor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (Tubadeza 2016). 
Unlike a previous populist president in the Philippines, Joseph E. 
Estrada (in office from 1998–2001), Duterte’s strongest support did not 
come from the poorest voters but rather from the elite and the middle-
class, the so-called “ABC” voters (Teehankee and Thompson 2016b). 
Those who are inclined to believe that the Duterte’s rise is part of the 
global outrage against growing inequality overlook the fact that his core 
supporters during the campaign were among the country’s most pros-
perous voters, even if his support base expanded after his election. Why 
was Duterte able to win the presidency by appealing to the better off in 
society with his illiberal pledge to combat drug dealers, as well as threats 
to restore authoritarian rule despite the apparent stability of democratic 
rule and rapid economic growth? 
In the first part of this paper I argue that although Aquino was 
widely perceived to be personally honest, his administration has become 
“systemically disjunctive.” It became vulnerable to replacement by vio-
lent illiberalism because its narrative of “good governance” had been 
undermined, its strategic allies were weakened, and liberal institutions 
                                                 
2  In December 2015, according to Pulse Asia data (2015–2016), “crime” was 
only the sixth “most urgent national concern” (at 25 per cent), behind control-
ling inflation, workers’ pay, corruption, creating more jobs, and reducing pov-
erty. However, once Duterte’s late campaign began in earnest, public opinion 
changed, with crime becoming the number-one concern in June 2016 at 52 per 
cent. By September 2016 crime had again become only the sixth most urgent 
concern, at 31 per cent.  
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(particularly the judiciary) discredited. In other words, Aquino’s personal 
popularity could not keep liberal reformism from being discredited as a 
form of political order. In fact, because he was popular, voters blamed 
“the system” for these failures rather than Aquino personally. 
The second part of the paper will discuss how Duterte was able to 
“bloody democracy” despite supposed widespread support among Fili-
pinos for democratic institutions and a limited concern about drugs and 
criminality. I will argue that Duterte is an illiberal populist who mobilised 
a mass constituency through the media (particularly social media) with 
the use of radical rhetoric portraying a corrupt elite that coddles drug 
dealers and addicts. Put more theoretically, he changed the prevailing 
liberal reformist political order into an illiberal one through a new law 
and order governing script, new key strategic groups (the communist left 
and the police), and the quick removal of remaining liberal constraints 
(particularly in Congress and the Supreme Court). Duterte constructed a 
strongman political model at the local level before “nationalising” it after 
his election as president.  
Disjunctive Liberal Reformism 
Why did liberal reformist oriented electoral democracy in the Philippines 
prove vulnerable to Duterte’s bloody political challenge despite strong 
economic growth, improving transparency and credit ratings as well as 
the popularity of outgoing president Noynoy Aquino? In the post-
Marcos Philippines, the discourse of liberal reformism – the claim that 
re-establishing democracy, fighting corruption, and improving the effi-
ciency of governance should be the country’s top priorities – has been 
used by most presidents as their chief campaign narrative and then “re-
gime script.” It can be understood as a “bourgeois” political storyline 
that promises “I will not steal from you.” It skirts questions of equality, 
much less redistribution, avoiding direct class-based appeals. It can ap-
pear uncaring and morally self-righteous, particularly as poverty rates and 
unemployment have remained high during the post-Marcos era (Thomp-
son 2010).  
Following Stephan Skowronek’s (1997 and 2006) notion of a presi-
dential “regime” (but modifying it to apply it to the “developing country” 
context of the Philippines), I argue that a political order consists of a 
campaign narrative that becomes a “ruling script” upon a candidate’s 
election as president, political as well as non-electoral elite “strategic 
group” supporters, and a particular institutional arrangement (for earlier 
efforts at such an analysis, see Thompson 2014b and Teehankee 2016b). 
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The post-Marcos liberal reformist political order consisted of a good 
governance narrative (“no corruption, no poverty”), key strategic groups 
(particularly big business, the Catholic Church, social democratic activists, 
and the military) and relatively liberal institutions (even if these institu-
tions were quite weak, particularly political parties and the judiciary). The 
“disjunction” of the liberal reformist order provides an explanation of 
why Duterte’s promise to resort to violence to solve the country's drug 
problem, to which he linked other problems, particularly corruption, 
proved so effective during his presidential campaign. Duterte was able to 
radicalise Aquino’s reformism, jettisoning its liberalism by promising 
quick results through extra-legal means.  
Aquino was widely seen as honest – with no revelations about ma-
jor scandals involving his relatives. By contrast, Aquino’s predecessor 
Arroyo was the most unpopular post-Marcos president, with key scan-
dals linked to her husband and son. This allowed Aquino to claim that it 
was Arroyo’s poor leadership that was to blame for her failings, not the 
reformist political order. Given Aquino’s personal popularity, however, 
the problems of liberal reformism could no longer be blamed on an 
individual, but were now attributed to the nature of the political order 
itself. This “systemic disjunction” set the stage for it to be replaced by an 
illiberal alternative. 
Undermining Reformism 
Unlike his scandal-plagued predecessor, President Benigno “Noynoy” S. 
Aquino (affectionately known to his supporters as PNoy, but to his en-
emies as “B.S. Aquino”) long seemed able to do no wrong. He promised 
to take the “straight path” (Daang Matuwid) to clean up corruption, which 
he claimed would also eradicate poverty. The Philippines’ economic 
growth accelerated to the highest among the Association of Southeast 
Asian (ASEAN) nations. Corrupt politicians seemed finally be held ac-
countable. More people paid their taxes after a Bureau of International 
Revenue crackdown. On the coattails of Aquino’s high opinion poll 
ratings, pro-administration candidates dominated mid-term congression-
al elections in 2013. International credit ratings agencies such as Fitch 
gave his administration a vote of confidence as well, upping the coun-
try’s rating to investment-grade. The Philippines steadily improved its 
ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
moving from 129th most corrupt (out of 177 countries) in 2011 to 105th 
in 2012 and to 95th in 2015 (Tradingeconomics 2016). Aquino seemed to 
be moving fast along a “straight path.” 
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However, in the second half of his presidency the Aquino admin-
istration’s reformist credentials were eroded by a pork barrel scandal, 
rampant smuggling, as well as unaddressed structural problems – high 
unemployment and poverty rates despite economic growth with only 
marginal improvement in education and healthcare for the masses. Aptly 
symbolising troubles ahead was the Aquino administration’s inability to 
deal quickly and effectively with the devastation caused by the super-
typhoon Haiyan (known as “Yolanda” in the Philippines) in large parts 
of the Western Visayas in 2013. Liberal reformism had hit a “dead end” 
(Thompson 2014a). 
Particularly damaging to the Aquino administration’s good govern-
ance narrative were revelations about the Priority Development Assis-
tance Fund (PDAF), the main vehicle for government pork barrel. The 
scandal’s impact was wide ranging. It turned out that the doling out of 
patronage to legislators had been crucial to getting them to pass reform-
ist legislation or to remove supposedly corrupt officials (with revelations 
about pork barrel funds for “soft projects” going to senators who voted 
in favour of Supreme Court Chief Justice Corona’s removal from office 
after impeachment on corruption charges drawing particular scorn; Tig-
lao 2013). Moreover, it was revealed pork barrel funds often ended up in 
legislators’ pockets instead of going to slated projects. Only anti-Aquino 
legislators were targeted in the follow-up investigation, which raised 
suspicions that Aquino was using the chance to strike back at political 
enemies rather than make a serious effort to eliminate pork barrel abuses 
(Holmes forthcoming). 
The Aquino government was also widely considered to have failed 
in delivering efficient public services because of under-spending on in-
frastructure, allowing public transportation in Manila to decay with traf-
fic becoming among the worst in Asia (dubbed “carmageddon” by Phil-
ippine netizens). Moreover, there was a major military debacle when 44 
members of the Special Armed Forces sent to arrest a wanted Islamic 
terrorist were massacred in a bungled operation in southern Mindanao in 
January 2016, the so-called Mamasapano incident. Just three months 
later, several farmers protesting the delay in the delivery of relief goods 
to a drought hit part of Mindanao were killed and over 100 more were 
injured in a violent police crackdown. There was also a growing sense 
that the illegal drug problem was spiralling out of control and that crimi-
nality generally was on the rise during Aquino’s time in office, even if the 
statistical evidence for this proved to be dubious (Baldwin and Marshall 
2016). Aquino himself admitted his pledge to clean up the Bureau of 
Customs had failed miserably (with three customs commissioners quit-
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ting due to purported political pressure exercised by smugglers during 
Aquino’s six-year term; Magno 20163).  
Aquino’s fall from grace is particularly striking given that he had 
claimed legitimacy based on the promise of promoting “good govern-
ance.” Not only has graft remained while government competence in key 
areas is often low, but the fundamental structure of Philippines society 
has changed little either – symbolised by the Aquino-Cojuangco family’s 
tenacious resistance to court-ordered land redistribution of its huge sugar 
plantation Hacienda Luisita. More generally, the communist left was 
largely excluded from policy making and social issues, including land 
reform, were not prioritised. The Philippines’ impressive macro-
economic growth during the Aquino presidency was largely been fuelled 
by remittances from the 10 per cent of the country’s population working 
abroad – often in menial jobs – and business process-outsourcing – 
primarily call centres that are mainly foreign-owned and can easily be 
moved to another country. Antoinette R. Raquiza (2014) showed that a 
new group of tycoons has emerged and overshadowed the old landed 
oligarchy, but also demonstrated that their wealth is based not primarily 
in industry but in a rapidly growing service sector and in often specula-
tive real estate investments. Furthermore, economic growth remains 
profoundly unequal. In 2013, Philippine economist Cielito Habito calcu-
lated that the growth in the aggregate wealth of the country’s 40 richest 
families in 2011 was equivalent to over three-quarters of the increase in 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in that year. Unemploy-
ment rose during Aquino’s presidency, while poverty hardly dipped (with 
self-reported poverty actually rising). Aquino did increase government 
funding of an anti-poverty programme, a Brazilian-style conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) scheme. But critics such as Maria Victoria R. Raquiza 
(2016) have argued the increase in CCT benefits has been motivated by 
the ruling Liberal Party’s desire for more patronage resources for elec-
tions would have been better spent on providing universal social services 
and boosting industrial policy to create more jobs. 
In the unusually volatile 2016 Philippine presidential campaign, in 
which polls showed three different candidates leading the field at various 
stages, Mar Roxas, Aquino’s handpicked successor, always trailed. With 
                                                 
3  Commenting on the resignation of a third customs chief, John Sevilla, political 
scientist and commentator Alex Magno (2016) said it “is a repeat of the pattern 
suffered by his two predecessors in the BoC [Bureau of Customs]. All three 
customs commissioners appointed under the current administration tried to 
deal with the “Big 17.” They all lost their jobs. The syndicate enjoys political 
protection all the way up.” 
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liberal reformism tarnished during the second half of the Aquino presi-
dency, Roxas’ promise to continue the policies of the Aquino administra-
tion proved a non-starter (Teehankee and Thompson 2015). Roxas’ 
credibility was already damaged by his performance as a cabinet member 
in the Aquino administration. He was widely faulted for repeated break-
downs in public transportation and for missteps in managing relief oper-
ations after Typhoon Haiyan (called Yolanda in the Philippines) in 2013. 
Although a good debater (many neutral observers claim he won all three 
presidential debates), Roxas was a poor campaigner, often seen as haugh-
ty and aloof and unable to connect with voters about their chief con-
cerns – a problem accentuated by the active role played in the campaign 
by his controversial wife Korina Sanchez, a well-known television broad-
caster. Roxas was also seen to have sided with some of the most dubious 
local politicians in the Philippines in his (misplaced) hope that their sup-
port would boost his Liberal Party campaign. 
Marginalising Pro-poor Populism 
There has long been an alternative narrative available to liberal reform-
ism in Philippine post-Marcos electoral politics that promised to address 
the plight of the neglected poor. Only somewhat less dramatically than in 
Thailand, where pro-poor Thaksin-linked governments have been re-
peatedly overthrown by “yellow-shirt” elites culminating in the 2014 
military coup, Philippine “yellows” have overthrown a sitting president, 
cheated a leading presidential candidate and discredited a frontrunner in 
their “successful” effort to “defeat” politicians claiming to represent the 
poor (Thompson 2016b). In the Philippine context, pro-poor populism 
has involved media-based appeals to the poor by “movie star” populists 
(Hedman 2001) with promises to help the common tao (people) op-
pressed by elites. Downtrodden cinematic heroes fighting for the rights 
of poor victims against corrupt elites drew a vast masa (the poor masses) 
audience that could later be solicited for votes. 
Despite being in office for less than half of his presidential term, 
Estrada, the former movie star elected president in 1998, did much more 
for the poor than he is commonly credited for, particularly in the realm 
of land reform and the introduction of inexpensive government treasury 
bills to offer safe investments to the less well-off (Borras 2007: 249–252; 
Torrevillas 2013). Accused of corruption, Estrada was overthrown in an 
elite-led insurrection in early 2001 when the Philippine congress failed to 
remove him from office. Although he was an elected president and still 
popular among the country’s disadvantaged, Estrada was brought down 
in by protests known as “EDSA Dos” (the street in which the two peo-
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ple power uprisings took place) by a coalition of the Catholic church 
hierarchy, big business leaders, and middle-class civil society activists 
ultimately backed by the military brass, making it a people power putsch 
(Thompson 2016a).  
Estrada’s successor was his vice-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 
who had been elected in 1998 largely on the basis of her image as a re-
former. Her administration lacked legitimacy after taking power in an 
extra-constitutional manner and then manipulating the 2004 presidential 
election to “defeat” Estrada’s friend and fellow movie star politician 
Fernando Poe, Jr., widely known as FPJ.  
The most recent episode of elite efforts to defeat populism involved 
the discrediting of Aquino’s vice president and 2016 presidential candi-
date Jejomar “Jojo” Binay. Adopting a pro-poor populist narrative simi-
lar to Estrada and FPJ, Binay appealed to the majority of Filipinos who 
tell pollsters that they consider themselves to have gained little from 
recent rapid economic growth, the benefits of which were largely con-
fined to the rich and parts of the middle class. However, Binay’s cam-
paign was derailed by corruption charges – very publicly made in con-
gressional hearings in which Aquino’s allies played a major role – and 
made worse by a several blunders during the campaign, which only 
seemed to underline that Binay was little more than a typical “traditional 
politician” who would only rob the country blind. The undermining of 
the “good governance” narrative might not have led to the turn to vio-
lent, illiberal populism had pro-poor populism not been so effectively 
marginalised by “reformist” elites. 
Weakening Elite Support and Discrediting Liberal  
Institutions 
Elite support of the liberal reformist political order weakened significant-
ly during the post-Marcos period, contributing to its disjunctive character. 
Although the Catholic Church hierarchy has long been very powerful in 
Philippine society, it became a particularly important independent actor 
after it was politicised under Marcos’ rule (Youngblood 1990). Coeli 
Barry (2006) wrote that after the Church’s “eleventh hour transformation 
from ‘critical collaboration’ to […] criticism of the Marcos regime” it was 
able to take a prominent “place in the public sphere […] as a crucial 
force in the overthrow of authoritarianism.” Barry continued that in the 
post-Marcos era the Church’s leaders have embraced their “role as a 
guardian of democracy,” thereby securing for the Church “a prominent 
place in the Philippine political landscape” (Barry 2006: 157). With Cory 
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Aquino, the first post-Marcos president, embracing its guardianship role, 
the Church became a major supporter of her conservative reformist 
project of elite democracy and good governance. As in 1986, when he 
strongly backed Aquino in her protests against Marcos that led to his 
downfall, in early 2001 Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin led the rest 
of the Catholic hierarchy in support of “EDSA Dos”, a supposed second 
“people power” that toppled the pro-poor populist, as discussed above. 
After the death in 2005 of Sin, the informal leader of the Church, its 
leadership became more fragmented, also through a reorganisation of the 
Manila Archdiocese into several dioceses with their own bishops. In the 
wake of revelations of sexual abuses in the Roman Catholic Church, 
internal divisions emerged within the Catholic hierarchy, making it more 
difficult for the country’s Catholic bishops to take a unified stance 
against Arroyo after her manipulation of the 2004 election and other 
scandals that emerged after the 2005 “Hello Garci” revelations. At the 
same time, Arroyo pampered a group of church leaders, known as the 
Malacanang bishops, ensuring their loyalty during the insurrectionist 
onslaught of military rebels and civil society (Rufo 2013). During 
Noynoy Aquino’s presidency, the Catholic Church hierarchy led a high-
profile campaign against a relatively mild reproductive health (RH) bill 
(which focused on making contraception more widely available to the 
poor and not mentioning abortion despite the large number of danger-
ous “back alley” abortions in the Philippines), which the women’s 
movement strongly supported (Mendoza 2013). Although the bill passed 
in late 2013, the Church led efforts to have the Supreme Court partially 
block it and its congressional allies defund it. 
A bastion of liberal critiques of human rights abuses during the 
Marcos and, to a lesser extent during the post-Marcos period, the 
Church was easily out-manoeuvred by Duterte, who threatened to ex-
pose their sex scandals (claiming himself to have been abused by a priest 
as a child), involvement in corruption, and again pointing to their hard-
line stance against all forms of reproductive health as a hazard to Filipi-
nas’ well-being. It was not until mid-September 2016 – two and a half-
months after Duterte took office and after almost 3,000 people had been 
killed in his “war on drugs” – that that the Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
of the Philippines issued its first statement against extra-judicial killings 
(Baldwin and Serapio 2016).  
Civil society activists have been the most volatile and easily mobilis-
able elite strategic group in the post-Marcos Philippines. Their leaders 
have often crossed over to serve in presidential cabinets, although they 
have sometimes found themselves double-crossed by feckless presidents 
  Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism 49
 

 
(Reid 2008; Lewis 2013). Civil society has been vulnerable to co-optation 
by the elites despite the fact that many NGOs are led by different fac-
tions of the Philippine Left. During the administration of Noynoy Aqui-
no, as during the early Arroyo administration (before they broke with her 
after the “Hello Garci” scandal), so-called social democrats linked to 
intellectuals and activists close to the Jesuits in the Catholic Church 
(known to be progressive on social issues) were dominant among civil 
society activists. They also took the lion share of government positions 
related to social welfare. But the PDAF pork barrel scandal, the poor 
management of reconstruction of the Haiyan typhoon and other natural 
disasters, and continued high levels of social inequality, unemployment 
and poverty despite high growth gradually disillusioned and discredited 
these moderate left elements. They were also notably subdued support in 
their support for the candidacy of Mar Roxas, despite his promise to 
carry forward Aquino’s “straight path” toward “good governance.” With 
Duterte’s election, this once-powerful group of social democrats found 
itself quickly marginalised.  
Few major institutional reforms had been made during the Aquino 
administration, with the problems of the Philippine justice system being 
a particularly obvious unresolved problem. Symbolic of the phenomenon 
of “justice delayed” was the trial of those accused of committing the 
2009 Maguindanao massacre that killed 57 people, including 32 journal-
ists and media workers, which Aquino had vowed would be concluded 
with the perpetrators brought to justice (Jose 2015). Despite Nonoy 
Aquino’s vow to deliver justice to the victims before his presidential 
term ended in 2016, the trial has been beset by delays, with not a single 
suspect convicted as of this writing.  
More embarrassing still was a police raid of the national Bilibid 
Prison, the largest jail in the Philippines, in late 2014, which led to revela-
tions that drug lords were “living like kings” in “secret luxury cells with 
strip bars, sex dolls, a Jacuzzi and methamphetamines” with “luxury 
villas, for drugs lords, kidnap gang leaders and other powerful inmates, 
were scattered around the sprawling 500-hectare compound” (ABC 
2014). Although the raid was led by Aquino’s justice secretary, questions 
arose as to why the problem had been allowed to fester so long. Some 
critics complained of Aquino’s “consensus approach” reflecting “the 
Kantian dogma of liberalism,” which made him soft in terms of security 
and criminality issue in the interest of the “protections of people from 
excessive regulation” (Dizon and Cabalza 2016). While this critique 
seems overblown, particularly in light of crime statistics that show major 
crimes being in decline during the Aquino administration (Baldwin and 
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Marshall 2016), it appears representative of the perception of the Aquino 
administration as weak on crime and incapable of enforcing the law. 
Moreover, the selectivity of prosecution of those legislators found to 
have used their PDAF pork barrel – cases filed by the Department of 
Justice were confined to Aquino’s enemies – increased cynicism about 
his commitment to the rule of law (San Juan 2015). The weaknesses of 
the justice system and the supposed neglect of criminality and drug abuse 
by the Aquino administration provided Duterte with the opportunity to 
launch his illiberal law-and-order campaign narrative and assemble a new 
elite coalition to undermine liberal institutions. 
Bloodied Democracy 
The drug problem in the Philippines is serious, but not severe, with sta-
tistics showing substance abuse in decline and crime falling (Baldwin and 
Marshall 2016). Duterte has exaggerated the problem, inflating the num-
ber of drug users to almost double what the government’s own estimate 
had been (Mangahas et al. 2016). Several populist parties in Europe (such 
as those in Germany and Sweden) have made a dramatic increase in 
immigration their major campaign themes. In the Philippines, by con-
trast, Duterte managed to “perform a crisis”, striking a chord with a 
“frustrated public” with his promise to crack down on drugs (Curato 
2016a: 7). Rather than criticise the Aquino regime for its social neglect, 
as Binay did with his pro-poor message during the presidential campaign, 
Duterte’s “dystopian narrative shifted the discussion to a more urgent 
solution,” the arrest and/or killing of drug dealers and users “until the 
problem is eradicated.” But this “comes at a price” Duterte warned, “the 
price of liberal rights” (Curato 2016a: 7). 
Despite being an inexact, slippery and impressionistic political term, 
one common feature of “populism” across the globe is that “the people” 
are contrasted with a corrupt elite and often also a minority group seen 
to be a cause of societal ills, who are put outside of “authentic” society 
(Canovan 1999). Today’s populists are often not explicitly anti-democ-
ratic, but their “principled anti-pluralist” conception of “the people” – 
simple and good – means that they are only “impersonators” of demo-
crats (Müller 2016). There are different ideological directions in populism. 
Putzel (2016) distinguished between “left populism” (Sanders, Corbyn, 
Spain’s Podemos and, one could add, Estrada, FPJ and Binay in the 
Philippines), which “taps into people’s anger by appealing to their sense 
of social justice and calling for the regulation of capitalism”, and “right 
populism” that “appeals to people’s fears and prejudices” (such as Don-
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ald Trump in the US and Marie Le Pen in France). Jan-Werner Müller 
(2016, also see Judis 2016) argued that, for right populists,  
elites are often immoral in the specific sense that they actually 
work only for themselves (as opposed to the common good) and 
for essentially undeserving minorities who do not truly belong to 
the demos. (Müller 2016) 
Viewed from this analytical perspective, despite Duterte’s strong nation-
alism and ties to the communist left (see below and Julio C. Teehankee’s 
article (2016a) in this special issue), he can be classified analytically as an 
illiberal “right” populist who has mobilised a mass constituency through 
the media, particularly social media, (Singpeng 2016) with the use of 
radical rhetoric portraying a corrupt elite that coddles drug dealers and 
addicts. Duterte’s demonology does not focus on abstract, structural 
factors (“globalisation” and “capitalism”) like that of “left” populists but 
rather on a specific group deemed sub-human and worthy of extermina-
tion: drug dealers and users. Duterte considers drug addicts “beyond 
redemption” because “once you’re addicted to shabu [the term used for 
crystal meth in the Philippines], rehabilitation is no longer a viable option” 
(Esmaquel 2016). In Duterte’s so-called “war on drugs,” suspects die in 
“encounters” with police, are shot by motorcycle-riding vigilante gun-
men, or are killed by trained and unofficial police death squads. Their 
tortured and taped-up bodies are left with a cardboard confessional sign 
strapped around their necks, saying “pusher” or “drug lord”, and 
dumped under a bridge or in a neighbouring town. The guilt of victims is 
assumed – never proven, seriously investigated, or even questioned. The 
thousands of extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and users 
during Duterte’s first few months in office (Rappler 2016) and his denun-
ciations of the United Nations, Western countries, and human rights 
groups, both international and domestic, that dared to criticise his vio-
lent drug crackdown signal “a more virulent form of populism” (Putzel 
2016). Following Pratt (2007), Nicole Curato (2016a, also see 2016b) 
speaks of the “fantasy” of “penal populism”: a “virtuous public” set 
apart from “degenerates who do not deserve due process.” 
It is not surprising Duterte’s strongman image resonated so strongly 
with many Filipinos when it is considered that nearly two-thirds of Fili-
pino respondents answered in waves 4 and 6 of the World Values Survey 
that they favoured “strong leaders” and that nearly half said they pre-
ferred military to civilian rule (World Values Survey 2015). Eric Vincent C. 
Batalla (personal correspondence) has pointed out that while Filipinos 
may claim they want “a democratic system, many also entertain the idea 
of a strong leader and autocratic rule.” Given his appeal as an illiberal 
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populist strongman, Duterte has taken advantage of the systemic vulner-
ability of liberal reformism to begin building a new elite coalition around 
his law-and-order narrative, which is moving quickly to remove institu-
tional constraints to a violent anti-drug campaign and to make major 
constitutional change. 
Duterte’s Illiberal Coalition and the Dismantling of  
Liberal Institutions 
Although Duterte came to power with what can fairly be termed a “mi-
cro-party” (Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan, Philippine 
Democratic Party-Power of the People) with only one senator and three 
seats in the House of Representatives, it soon become the ruling party 
through a familiar process of defections to the winning president’s side 
(known as “political butterflies” or balimbings in the Philippines after the 
multi-pronged star fruit). Surprisingly, Aquino himself was sanguine 
about the defections from his majority Liberal Party (which held the 
majority of seats in the Senate and House) that were led by former Sen-
ate President Frank Drillon and House Speaker Belmonte (Dizon 2016). 
This mass turncoatism occurred despite Liberal Party warnings during 
the campaign that Duterte planned to erect a dictatorship. It also indicat-
ed how hollow the Liberal Party’s promise to become a “programmatic” 
party with a clear political doctrine and membership loyalty had been. It 
proved to be as much a party of “trapos” (traditional politicians) as every 
other. It can be surmised that this sudden change of heart among Liber-
als, despite Duterte’s continued illiberal rhetoric, was due to the desire to 
protect key members of the party from prosecution, most prominently 
former Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad and perhaps even 
Aquino himself for the Aquino administration’s DAP Disbursement 
Acceleration Program (DAP) patronage distribution scheme that had 
been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
With the Catholic Church on the defensive and social democratic 
civil society activists discredited and demobilised, as discussed above, 
two new groups have moved to the forefront in support of Duterte’s 
administration: the police and the communist left. In addition, the courts 
have been reluctant to intervene against Duterte’s violent crackdown on 
drugs and constitutional change open a potential Pandora’s box of grow-
ing illiberalism being institutionalised. 
The Philippine police have a long history of being subordinated to 
local politicians. Many Philippine warlords have their “own” police force. 
This gave the police the reputation of being little more than the coercive 
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arms of powerful politicians. Duterte’s rule in Davao was also closely 
linked to the police, particularly his local (and now Philippine National) 
police chief Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa. However, in his few months in 
power Duterte has already moved to increase the status and national 
significance of the police who are pleased with their new role as the 
enforcers of Duterte’s anti-drug campaign (Tawatao 2016), with one 
police official calling it the “golden age” of the Philippine police (Al-
mendral 2016). Significantly, Duterte has also moved to revive the Phil-
ippine Constabulary, a US colonial institution that became a bulwark of 
Marcos’ martial law regime and was subordinated to the military in the 
post-Marcos period in an effort to end some of its worst abuses during 
the authoritarian era. Duterte’s restoration of the Constabulary to inde-
pendent status is seen as a setback to efforts to civilianise the police and 
a return to a more militarised form of policing (Ranada 2016b). 
Duterte was known for relatively close ties to communist leaders 
during his time as mayor of Davao. One of his closest advisors, Leoncio 
Evasco, whom he appointed to the key position of secretary to the cabi-
net, is a former communist whom he sent to jail when a city prosecutor, 
but later befriended. Duterte appointed several key militant leaders 
linked to the communists to cabinet positions related to social issues 
(labour secretary, social welfare, and agrarian reform). Business leaders 
have already complained about efforts to raise the minimum wage as well 
as discussions about ending short-term contractualisation that deprives 
workers of benefits (known as endo, as in end of contract) (McBeth 
2016).4 
However, the communist left’s support has proved useful for 
Duterte. By invoking anti-colonial nationalism against the left’s old nem-
esis, the United States, thereby gaining sympathy from lower-ranking 
officers in the military and the police, Duterte has been able to pre-empt 
the long running violent conflict between the communist left and the 
military, building a kind of united front against the Americans from 
without and against drug dealers from within. The communist left had 
been at the forefront of previous human rights campaigns against gov-
ernment “salvaging” (an easily misunderstood Filipino-English expres-
sion that does not refer to saving someone but rather connotes their 
                                                 
4  It is unclear how much business leaders really have to fear. While claiming he is 
the Philippines’ “first left-leaning president,” Duterte’s economic agenda has 
thus far not veered far from the neoliberal orthodoxy of his predecessors. He 
has even called for a loosening of limits on foreign investment. For more on 
Duterte’s economic policy see Eric Vincent C. Batalla’s contribution to this 
special issue (Batalla 2016). 
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death through extra-judicial killing). This is not surprising as activists 
engaged in legal activities linked to the communist left were targeted in 
such campaigns, particularly during the Arroyo administrations, in which 
extra-judicial killings spiked (with estimates ranging from several hun-
dred to over 1,000 leftists killed5). However, aside from issuing one con-
demnation of the drug killings in August, the far left has been largely 
silent or even supportive of Duterte despite his obvious violation of 
human rights, an issue that used to be at the top of their agenda.6 
 It might be assumed the judiciary would be at the forefront of the 
efforts to curb extra-judicial killings under Duterte. However, having 
already been on the defensive since the removal of Chief Justice Renato 
Corona by the Aquino administration for quite transparently political 
motives, the Supreme Court has been wary of confronting a president 
head-on. A number of judges, including Supreme Court justices, have 
faced accusations of political influence pedalling and even plagiarism 
(Vitug 2012), which is another reason to avoid confrontation with a 
president known to be skilful at using his opponents’ weaknesses against 
them. When Supreme Court Chief Justice Sereno criticised Duterte for 
naming several judges on his “narcolist,” instead urging him to abide by 
the rule of law in his fight against drugs and raising concerns about ex-
trajudicial killings he admitted the courts had been too slow to deal cases 
against hundreds of thousands of people suspected of involvement in 
drugs and threatened to declare martial law (Jerusalem and Ramos 2016). 
Appearing to back down, the Supreme Court then ordered a probe or-
dered a probe into four of the judges named who were still on the bench 
(although as usual, the Philippine president offered no evidence for the 
accusations, with one of the accused judges having already died eight 
                                                 
5  In his report Parreño (2011) counted 305 extra-judicial killings between 2001 
and 2010 (Arroyo’s term in office), while Casiño (2016) quotes Karapatan, a 
human rights group, which estimates there were 1,206 extra-judicial killings 
during this period. 
6  Ramon Casiple (2016), executive director of the Institute for Political and 
Electoral Reform, played down the thousands of extra-judicial killings, claiming 
that the anti-drug campaign had been a “success” in terms of reducing the drug 
trade (also see Valente 2016). By contrast, another leading left activist, former 
Bayan Muna member of the House of Representatives Teodoro (“Teddy”) 
Casiño warned that the “initial indifference when [communist left] activists 
started getting killed during the Arroyo regime is similar to today’s ambivalence 
in the face of the killings of suspected drug addicts and pushers […] Denounc-
ing the killings should not mean condoning the alleged illegal activities of its 
victims. What it should translate to is a demand for the police and military to 
follow the law and respect due process and human rights […].” 
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years earlier) (Mogato and Birsel 2016). With few judicial constraints, 
Duterte’s killing spree has continued unabated. 
Duterte as Law and Order “Boss” 
For nearly three decades before he became president, Duterte was either 
mayor or the power-behind-the-throne (first with his one-time political, 
and later his daughter, standing in for him) of the large city of Davao 
located in the southern island of Mindanao. Writing about his Davao 
reign in 2002, Time magazine (Zabriski 2002) dubbed him “Dirty Harry” 
(after the movie with a policeman as vigilante), portraying Duterte as a 
motorcycle-riding, gun-toting mayor and comparing him to “The Pun-
isher” (after the vigilante Marvel comic book figure) for condoning the 
summary execution of alleged criminals. Duterte used his record as Da-
vao mayor as his campaign calling card. It was during his time as mayor 
that he crafted a tough-guy (siga) image, proclaiming himself the saviour 
of communist-infiltrated and crime-infested Davao (Teehankee and 
Thompson 2016b). The people of Davao “allowed him to rule with an 
iron-fist in exchange for social peace and personal security” (Isaac and 
Aceron 2016). Duterte shrugged off accusations of human-rights abuses, 
promising to implement his Davao model nationwide. 
Duterte was not the first presidential candidate to run on a law and 
order platform: former Police Chief Panfilo Lacson had the slogan “Iron 
Fist” in 2004 presidential elections (Curato 2016a). But Duterte’s narra-
tive was more “compelling” about “what can be done if he is in charge 
[…] He calls it Exhibit A: Davao City” (Curato 2016a). Duterte pointed 
to Davao as a city transformed from violence and conflict (the “murder 
capital of the Philippines”) to a peaceful place where business and cul-
ture flourished and which had been named among the most liveable in 
Asia. Duterte claimed to have shown the benefits strongman rule could 
bring at the local level: he now promised all Filipinos similar advantages 
if he was elected the nation’s president.  
John Sidel’s notion of “bossism” captures Duterte’s leadership style 
well. Sidel’s study (2004: 55; more comprehensively, Sidel 1999) of local 
bosses in the Philippines defined bossism as 
local brokers who enjoy an enduring monopolistic position over 
coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks 
[such as] long-term mayors who ran their municipalities as their 
private fiefdoms […].  
Duterte, who long enjoyed a monopoly on violence in Davao, has quick-
ly usurped such coercive powers at the national level as well since being 
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elected president. Duterte was in fact part of a subset of warlords who 
did not focus on fighting his political enemies, rather reserving most of 
his wrath and firepower for drug criminals, allowing him to cut deals 
with communist insurgents and make peace with surrounding political 
bosses to make it easier to fight “the bad guys.” As Danilo Reyes (see his 
article in this special issue) has shown, several mayors in the Philippines 
have pursued similar strategies of “eliminating” criminals through extra-
judicial killings, not only to deter crime but also to win popularity that 
has aided their repeated re-election. In an environment of lawlessness, 
where institutions are weak, the strongman who protects the good com-
mon tao (people) against the evil criminals is not only able to legitimise 
his ruthless modus operandi but also to ensure his long-term hold on office. 
Despite his repeated claim to be a reluctant presidential candidate, 7 
Duterte apparently tired of being merely a local boss, overcoming his 
ennui by becoming the Philippines’ boss-in-chief.  
Aside from the significance of Duterte’s local political background, 
he was also able to use his status as a political outsider from the southern 
island of Mindanao to his advantage. Mobilising sentiment against “im-
perial Manila” as the first mayor from a major city outside the capital to 
launch a viable presidential bid, he could not only count on solid support 
in eastern Mindanao but draw backing from his Cebuano co-linguists in 
the central Visayas. He also gained support in the northern island of 
Luzon generally, as many local politicians defected to his side, further 
adding to his campaign’s momentum. 
Preliminary research by Putzel (2016) has shown that besides his re-
gional strengths, with his strongman law and order campaign, Duterte 
polled strongly in urban areas where media-based political narratives are 
most crucial to attracting votes. In cities with a population of 100,000 or 
more Duterte received 45 per cent of the vote, up from the 37.28 per 
cent he gained nationwide. By contrast, Roxas, with a weak reformist 
message, received only 18.6 per cent of the vote in such cities, compared 
to his 23.84 per cent of the vote nationwide. 
Another aspect of Duterte’s repeal that has received little systematic 
attention is his “informal” (read expletive-filled) political speech (Szilágyi 
                                                 
7  Duterte delayed his decision to run for president (he was filed at the last minute, 
substituting for another candidate put up by his party) and instead went on an 
extensive “listening tour” of the country under the guise of promoting federal-
ism (Teehankee and Thompson 2016: 129). Many saw it as a strategy that 
avoided unwanted scrutiny by his political enemies (who were at the time at-
tacking the frontrunner Binay, as discussed above and in Ronald D. Holmes’ 
article in this special issue).  
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and Thompson 2016). Duterte’s discursive style, which is vulgar and 
often offensive, has helped him connect to voters through its informality, 
known in the literature as “style switching,” the employment of an inap-
propriately informal style by political actors in public situations (Labov 
1973). Duterte was a charismatic campaigner with his “colourful” lan-
guage perceived as an indication of his “refreshing authenticity” (Santos 
2016). Duterte’s “backstage rhetoric” entertains crowds, with one re-
porter commenting: “Believe it or not, it’s his cursing that never fails to 
generate laughter even in formal, upscale settings” (Ranada 2016a). In 
fact, it is not despite but because of the context that Duterte’s cursing 
makes people laugh. Although the death of thousands of supposed drug 
dealers at addicts at the hands of police and vigilantes is no laughing 
matter, Duterte’s “style switching” helps keep the tone of his administra-
tion lighter than one might otherwise expect. 
Transgressing Liberalism 
Duterte has responded in typically feisty manner to international criti-
cism of his “war on drugs,” accusing foreign critics of hypocrisy and 
ignorance. He threatened to withdraw the Philippines from the UN if it 
continues to criticise the killings and called the US ambassador to the 
Philippines Philip Goldberg “gay” and a “son of a whore” for daring to 
raise questions about the “war on drugs.”8  
Duterte has also targeted his domestic enemies with overheated 
rhetoric. When Senator Leila de Lima launched a senate investigation of 
the killings and warned Duterte he could face trial by the International 
Criminal Court, he responded with a personal attack, accusing her of 
“sexual escapades” with her driver who had collected payoffs linked to 
illegal drugs while his allies removed her as head of the senate investiga-
tive committee with the lower house setting up several investigations of 
                                                 
8  Just as this article was being completed, Duterte accused (now former) US 
Ambassador to the Philippines Goldberg of plotting against his administration. 
The background is a purportedly leaked State Department briefing paper in 
which Goldberg analysed the early Duterte administration and its potential 
weaknesses – particularly as it turns away from the US, which the former am-
bassador is said to have claimed has alienated many pro-American Philippine 
politicians (Ang 2016). Goldberg supposedly called for the “the US govern-
ment to employ a combination of socio-economic-political-diplomatic moves 
against Duterte “to bring him to his knees and eventually remove him from of-
fice.” “Strategies to be employed” include isolating the Philippines politically 
and economically in Asia by “highlighting the basic question of the risk of do-
ing business in the Philippines” (Ang 2016). 
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de Lima instead. De Lima proved “vulnerable” to such accusations be-
cause she had sinned doubly in the context of a misogynist political cul-
ture: not only was she having an affair (although separated, this was 
considered worse than the behaviour of Duterte, who happily confessed 
to womanising) but she had also crossed class lines to do so. Duterte 
summed up the accusation with typical vulgarity: “De Lima is screwing 
not only her driver but also the nation” (Regalado 2016).  
The chair of the Philippine Human Rights Commission Chito Gas-
con has launched an investigation into the killings, leading Duterte to 
label him an “idiot.” Former Commission on Human Rights Chair Etta 
Rosales also criticised Duterte, saying that despite being a lawyer he is 
making a mockery of the criminal justice system. Duterte later threatened 
to kill human rights activists critical of his drug crackdown (Regalado 
2016). Duterte has been able to implement what he, comparing his drug 
war to Hitler’s genocide against the Jews, has himself inappropriately 
called “the final solution” to the Philippines’ drug problem (Lema and 
Mogato 2016), another striking example of Duterte’s discursive extrem-
ism, which has been matched by the violence of his drug crackdown. 
Duterte’s popularity soared upon the launch of his “war on drugs,” peak-
ing at over 90 per cent and remaining at 86 per cent after his first hun-
dred days in office despite thousands of extra-judicial killings (Daguna-
Bersamina 2016, for a more critical view see Parameswaram 2016).  
Duterte’s presidency has put the Philippine’s fragile democratic in-
stitutions to their severest test since the Marcos dictatorship was over-
thrown in a largely peaceful “people power” uprising 30 years ago. It is 
symbolic of the death of the EDSA (“Epifanio de los Santos”: the name 
of the street where anti-Marcos protests were centred) political order 
that Duterte ordered a “hero’s” reburial of Marcos in the Libingan ng 
mga Bayani cemetery, which took place in mid-November 2016 after 
Marcos critics failed to convince the Supreme Court to block the in-
ternment. 
Walden Bello, former congressman and noted activist-intellectual, 
pointed out that Duterte has not “feared to transgress liberal discourse 
(Bello 2016). Not only does this not trouble a significant part of the 
population, they’ve even clapped for it!” As shown above, Duterte’s core 
supporters are from the middle class, not the poor. “Dutertismo,” as the 
Philippine sociologist Randy David (2016) has termed it, has been driven 
by middle-class concerns about drugs and crime generally, as well as 
crumbling infrastructure, and continued corruption. Duterte’s aggressive 
electoral campaign played to the deep resentments of those marginally 
better off after a couple of decades of solid growth and despite the 
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“straight path” anti-corruption platform of the outgoing administration 
of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino. The “politics of anger” (Teehankee and 
Thompson 2016a) leaves little room for treating drugs as a health prob-
lem, and using the rule of law to deal with it, thereby avoiding the crimi-
nalisation of the poor (Dioquino 2016).  
Bello (cited in Dioquino 2016) has prophesised that the violent 
drive against illegal drugs will be ineffective in the long term and that it is 
“a war against the poor” that “only addresses the symptoms rather than 
the root cause.” Bello argued the solution is to address poverty, as drug 
use is “prevalent among the poor and underprivileged” (Bello, cited in 
Dioquino 2016). A recent study (Collins 2016a) of coercive anti-drug 
campaigns around the world concluded, after surveying the literature, 
that “the failures of the ‘war on drugs’ have been well documented.” 
Rather there is a need for “sustainable development which should be 
prioritized over eradication […] militarization, widespread criminaliza-
tion or any other ‘pigheaded’” anti-drug policies (Collins 2016a).9 
Conclusion 
By challenging liberal reformism despite his predecessor Noynoy Aqui-
no’s personal popularity, Duterte was able to take advantage of the “sys-
temic disjunction” of this once dominant political order – due to the 
discrediting of the good governance narrative, the weakening influence 
of key “strategic groups” backing it (particularly the Church and social 
democrats), and the vulnerability of key institutions. Duterte not only 
won the election but also quickly established a new political order. De-
ploying an illiberal populist “law and order” narrative during his presi-
dential campaign that has become the “governing script” of his early 
presidency, Duterte has assembled a new ruling coalition (with the police 
and communist left playing key roles) very distinctive from the previous 
liberal order. Any remaining institutional barriers to this illiberalism were 
quickly removed with mass defections to his once tiny political party and 
the timidity of the Supreme Court.10 Although a nascent elite (and fe-
                                                 
9  Collins (2016b) directly criticised Duterte’s drug policies in an editorial in a 
Manila newspaper arguing that based on evidence from similar coercive anti-
drug efforts around the world “the Philippines’ new ‘war’ will fail and society 
will emerge worse off from it.” 
10  Another concern is Duterte’s proposed constitutional changes. Although sup-
posedly focused on introducing a federal form of government, once constitu-
tional rewriting commences key liberal features of the present 1987 constitution 
might be removed to make it more in keeping with the country’s current illiber-
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male-led) opposition to Duterte has emerged, it remains largely power-
less and widely mocked.11 Under Duterte, democracy has been bloodied 
through the systematic violation of human rights in the name of a crack-
down on drugs through the impunity of the police, beginning with the 
elected president himself, who has encouraged and defended state vio-
lence, which has been organised by his loyal friend and former Davao 
police chief whom he appointed to run the national police. 
The precedent for such bloody rule was set during Duterte’s days as 
Davao mayor or its informal leader (through his family dynasty) for a 
generation following the fall of Marcos. But Duterte is a distinctive kind 
of warlord politician. Instead of fighting his political enemies, he focused 
his wrath and firepower on drug criminals, allowing him to cut deals with 
communist insurgents and make peace with surrounding political bosses. 
It also made him enormously popular in Davao as a “law and order” 
mayor who showed he meant business by ordering criminals killed en 
masse. Duterte now promises national political salvation by claiming that, 
given weak institutions, only violent strongman rule can bring political 
order to the country. 
                                                                                                    
al Zeitgeist. Duterte has repeatedly warned that he may be “forced” to declare 
martial law to complete his drug crackdown and has criticised the current con-
stitutional provision that requires the approval of the Supreme Court and Con-
gress before a president can declare martial law (Corrales 2016). Given Duter-
te’s open contempt for human rights and his violent “war on drugs,” the prom-
ised “overhaul of the Constitution can easily stoke the fear that it is an attempt 
to reinstate authoritarianism and curtail civil rights and political freedoms” 
(Agugay 2016). 
11  For their supporters, the “three Ls” – Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” 
Santo Tomas Robredo, Senator Leila de Lima, and Loida Nicholas Lewis, a 
leading Philippine-American activist – are the promising new “faces” of the 
opposition. But they are the object of (typically misogynist) scorn from “Duter-
tards” as “the three stooges,” the “three leading ‘Ls’ of the Liberal Party’s 
League of Loathsome Ladies. Their main mission in life […] is to trample the 
will of the Filipino people underfoot, overthrow the government they chose 
and install themselves or their surrogates to rule the nation […] by means of a 
petticoat palace coup” (The Volatilian 2016). Former president Fidel V. Ramos, 
long the eminence grise of Filipino politics (who played a role in the overthrow of 
Estrada, saving Arroyo from being toppled, and encouraging Duterte to run for 
the presidency) has become a kind of “semi-oppositionist” who, while continu-
ing to support his administration, called the first 100 days of Duterte’s presi-
dency a “huge disappointment and let-down”, which means the Philippines is 
“losing badly” by focusing on the drug crackdown instead of poverty, jobs, and 
investments (Sim 2016). 
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